A recent newspaper story suggests a significant change in the attitude of some baseball fans. While the phenomenon of harassment of players from the stands is not new, there seems to be a new spirit behind the hurling of bottles and other dangerous debris. Whereas such attacks were once motivated by scorn for poor performance or by a violent enthusiasm for the opposing team, spectators are now also apparently moved by envy. They are, according to a number of sportswriters, jealous and resentful of the high salaries and prestige of professional ballplayers. No doubt envy is an ancient phenomenon, but it is not one much discussed in recent moral philosophy. Both the neglect and the signs that it is becoming an increasingly large problem of personal and social life (I'll later be adding more to what might be taken to be the merely idiosyncratic behavior of sports fans) suggest the need for an analysis of its motives, dynamics and possible antidotes. Nietzsche seems to be one of the few modern thinkers who have devoted much attention to envy after the scholastics' �ttempt at an encyclopedic and systematic account of the virtues and vices .I Nietzsche's con cern with the subject is much more pervasive than is suggested by the scanty references to Neid and its derivatives in Schlechta's index; moreover, his analysis must be distinguished from the treatment of the allied concept of ress entiment which has generated much attention. (For example, envy is discussed at least fourteen times in Human, All-Too-Human, appropriately enough.) 2 It is necessary to distinguish envy from some similar attitudes with which it is often confused. To describe envy as a disturbance or distress caused by the good fortune of another would not be sufficiently precise. One might be disturbed at another's success and so propelled into an attempt to emulate or surpass the other's achievement, as a young runner might set as a standard for himself the records of a champion. This is the distinction, familiar to Aristotle, between envy and emulation or ambition. Envy must also be distinguished from jealousy. The jealous person resents the achievement of another because he believes that he deserves (or equally deserves) the reward or recognition in question. I am jealous of you for having obtained a job for which I believe that I have equal or better qualifications or I am jealous that you have received more applause than I when my performance in the play was equally good.J Envy ex ists when I simply resent your good fortune, your achievement or your recogni tion as such, without any thought that it is properly mine or that I might, with effon, become worthy of the same. This is the emotion which is close to Nietz· sche's ressentiment; it is a strictly re-active attitude which finds another's good as such to be despicable or disgusting. In John Rawls's formulation, to which N�etzsche .
':ould subscribe, "we may think of envy as the propensity to view wtth hosnhty the greater good of others even though their being more for· tunate than we are does not detract from our advantages."4
In order to understand what Nietzsche thinks about envy or, for that mat·
about any other significant topic it is necessary to see how the concept is ex· �tbtted and dramatized in his writings. For Nietzsche philosophical analysis is mseparable from the structure, style, and rhetorical context of what is said. I think we can make a first approach to the concept of envy by examining a chapter from Thus Spoke Zaratbustra, the most obviously narrative, dramatic and rhetorical of his writings. In the first part there is a section called "Of the Tree on the Mountainside" which may appear somewhat puzzling until it is realized that envy is the crucial notion around which this particular slice of the drama revolves. The form of the chapter is that of a parable or metaphor in which Zarathustra uses the tree as a way of understanding the condition of an envious youth. As Zarathustra says later, "Whenever your spirit wants to speak in parables or metaphors (Gleicbnisse) pay heed, for that is when your virtue has its origin and beginning."5
The chapter begins with Zarathustra's noticing that a young man has been avoiding him. This is rather unusual behavior even in the somewhat unclear social . world which we surmise in this book. Zarathustra has disciples and enemtes here; he has those who would give him advice (the prophet and the old woman who makes the notorious remark about the whip); and no doubt there are those who are indifferent to him. Why should anyone deliberately avoid Zarathustra? Zarathustra himself throws some light on this question in his first sp�ech. The situation of that speech is that by wandering through the moun tams, he has come across the young man in question leaning against a tree and gazing wearily into the valley. Grasping the tree Zarathustra begins his parable:
"If I wanted to shake this tree with my hands I should be unable to do it.
"But the wind, which we cannot see, torments it and bends it where it wishes. It is invisi· ble hands that torment and bend us the worst. Ordinary envy is wont to cackle when the envied hen has laid an egg, thereby relieving itself and becoming milder. But there is a yet deeper envy that in such a case becomes dead silent, desiring that every mouth should be sealed and always more and more angry because this desire is not gratified. Silent envy grows in silence.'
By speaking to the youth Zarathustra aims at breaking this downward spiral of silent envy.
The youth confirms the analysis: "I hear Zarathustra and I was just think· ing of him," he replies, standing up in confusion. That is, he confirms both Zarathustra's belief that his avoidance was the product of obsession rather than indifference and the principle of emotional action at a distance, for it seems to him that his thoughts have somehow led to Zarathustra's appearance. With so much established, Zarathustra's parable takes another turn. After seeking to calm the youth's alarm he says:
"Now it is with men as with this tree.
''The more it wants to rise into the heights and the light, the more determinedly do its roots strive earthward, downwards, into the darkness, into the depths-into evil."
There are several forms of envy and a number of allied attitudes. Of the latter, the one which receives the most extensive treatment in Nietzsche's work is the ressentiment of the weak and ill-favored against those who are strong and well turned out. This is a moral stance which begins with a sense of antithetical values. Nietzsche calls these "good and evil" in The Genealogy of Morals to distinguish the attitude from the self-affirming attitude of the "good" for whom the "bad" is merely a secondary concept. The envy described here is not of that son. Rather it is one which begins by wanting to "rise into the heights and the light"; that is, its first movement is an aspiration toward a goal. But there is a funher distinction between envy and ressentiment. As a moral attitude ressenti· ment does, although reactively, believe itself to be good, as the lambs that Nietzsche imagines in The Genealogy of Morals take themselves to be the moral antithesis of the evil birds or prey. Envy, on the contrary, may be relatively devoid of rationalization and find itself forced, despite itself, into what it regards as evil. " 'Yes, into evil!' cried the young man. 'How is it possible you can uncover my soul?' " Sanre guesses that black masses and similar phenomena may be conscious expressions of envy against God or the good, and thus consciously evil. In this case the goal has been exemplified by Zarathustra.
But even a keen and noble aspiration may be frustrated and turn toward "the depths-into evil." The particular form of evil here is that which is contained in the young man's explicit confession: "Behold, what have I been since you ap· peared among us? It is envy of you which has destroyed me!" Frustrated aspira· tions have a way of turning against those who have exemplified success in the pursuit in question.
The evil of envy is that it wishes harm to the envied one even at the ex· pense of the envier; it is willing to sacrifice its own good so as not to be con· fronted with the good of the other. The extreme case would be the murders cited by the sociologist Helmut Schoeck in his book on envy.1 In many cases the envious murderers were scarcely acquainted with their victims, in any or· dinary social sense of acquaintance. Here the envious one gives up his or her own freedom, a great good, simply for the sake of eliminating the rival or obstade.9 This is evil in the deepest sense, for it is not simply a choice of a perverse or narrow good to the exclusion of a more genuine or inclusive one, but the destruction or diminution of the goods in the situation without the achievement of any alternative goods. Now Zarathustra's darkest saying about such envy is his suggestion that this is a law of human life: "Now it is with men as with this tree."1o Taken together with the ressentiment of those who have no original aspirations, envy would appear to be not an occasional and unusual vice but the lot of almost all human beings. Now it may be possible to minimize certain kinds of envy in a system of political and economic justice like the one proposed by John Rawls, in which every such advantage of the more highly favored must be justified by its increasing the political and economic goods of the less favored members of the society. Even here there are limits, however; if half a society could become millionaires while the other half have their incomes increased by one dollar a year, it seems very likely that envy would be in· creased rather than diminished. In any case the causes of envy lie not only in the distribution of political and economic goods but in the frustration of noble aspirations or in an original feeling of worthlessness. Rawls suggests, without much empirical evidence, that the latter can itself be minimized by a just system of social arrangements. The former, involving such desires as those for athletic or romantic or scientific success, has no obvious antidote.
Still the question remains why such a pattern of response should be con· sidered typical rather than a deplorable and infrequent aberration. Zarathustra's fullest answer to this question is in the chapter "On Redemption." There all revenge is said to be "the will's antipathy toward time and time's 'It was.' " The ontological source of revenge (Racbe), which I take to be inclusive of both envy and ressentiment, is our apparent impotence in regard to the brute ac· tuality of the past. However successful the will may be in overcoming a variety of obstacles the sheer givenness of the past and our inability to change it leads to the will's turning rancorously against some substitute (which might be itself). Envy and ressentiment are often and ordinarily described as "dwelling on the past.'' To be envious is to remain ftxated on real or imaginary slights, humilia· tions, or contrasts of status which have already occurred. When envy ra· .
In rimitive societies and to a certain extent in our own such pervasiv e envy . recognizes the almost unlimited forms of envy in this aphorism: "He is envious; let us hope that he will not have children, for he would envy them because he cannot be a child anymore."' J In Zarathustra's final reply to the youth he tells him that because he still feels himself noble the others dislike him and "bose Blicken senden"-"give him the evil eye." (Interestingly Hollingdale and Kauf mann both miss the colloquial force of this expression in their translations; both have Zarathustra speak of casting or sending "evil glances" which neglects the systematic structure of beliefs of which "the evil eye" is a symptom). Now we may think of societies with a pervasive belief in "the evil eye" as quite different from our own or at least, as Rawls supposes, different from the society which would be in accordance with our own deepest principles of justice. Two factors, however, suggest that our sense of this difference may be exaggerated. One is the epochal event of the death of God; the other is the tendency in a time of shrinking resources and lower economic growth to adopt a steady-state, zero-sum model of society according to which anyone's gain must be someone else's loss. For Nietzsche these two factors can be systematically interrelated through the concept of "the last man"; but let us look at them separately for the time being.
Traditional religious belief may be interpreted as a device for minimizing. envy. In so-called primitive societies there is often an enormous hostility toward those who are different and a consequent fear of oneself being different from others. According to Rene Girard, one typical way of controlling the universal violence which might result from such �ensed differences is the ritual of scapegoating, that is of killing, devouring, or punishing a specific person (or animal substitute) which can be held to be significantly different· from all the rest of the society.14 In its classical form scapegoating takes the form of p � r�odically executing _ the sacred being whose kingship makes him uncannily dtstmct from all of hts subjects. In a more general way the concept of a trans � endent God performs much the same social function. By being absolutely supertor to all human beings, God is that which suggests our fundamental brotherhood of solidarity. Such attitudes are typically reinforced by the idea of a divine justice before which we are all fundamentally equal. In the absence of such transcendent contrast, however, there are fewer obstacles to focussing on the many differences between us. Accordingly the death of God ·leaves men with only each other to look at and with a correspondingly accentuated sense of their differences. In his talk "Of the Higher Man," Zarathustra says "'You Higher Men'-thus the mob blink-'there are no Higher Men, we are all equal, man is but man, before God-we are all equal!' ... But now this God has died." (Z, 297)
The belief in transcendent figures as a way of guaranteeing the equality of a group, and therefore of warding off envy, has many extensions. Nietzsche suggests that the cult of genius in the arts is a device for avoiding envy, for ex ample: "the cult of genius fosters our vanity, our self-love, for it is only when
we think of it as very far removed from us, as a miracle, that it does not wound us."lf It may be that the constant accessibility to the lives of actors and athletes through the mass media has helped to destroy their aura of separateness and has led to growth of envy like the one mentioned earlier in the changed behavior of baseball fans. Our own age is experiencing the tendency toward a steady-state society which may, despite a higher degree of affiuence, come to bear some significant structural analogies to the peasant village described by Lewis. To a large degree this tendency is certainly due to shrinking resources and burgeoning popula tion; but might it not also be a form of s�ciety which is likely to appeal to "the last man" and in which "the last man" is likely to flourish? No herdsman and one herd. Everyone wants the same thing, everyone is the same:
whoever thinks otherwise goes voluntarily into the madhouse.
"The last man" makes everything small because he has no sense of nobility; a society of "last men" will aim at equalizing the condition of all and of giving envy a rational form. Once envy has been rationalized an _ d institutionalized � he one who thinks or wills differently will no longer be subJected to scapegoanng or ostracism. It will be obvious that he does not fit into the levelled society and so will voluntarily enter the madhouse. Here we might think of the somewhat similar picture of the carceral society developed by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish. Foucault traces the change in the practice of punishment from the public ritual execution or degradation (wi � h many of the �eat � res . of religious scapegoating) to the formation of the prtson . as a . tot� msntunon designed to regularize and render predictable the behav10r of 1ts mmates; that is, to suppress all differences. Such institutions, significantly enough, are pro· jected in an extreme form in Jeremy Bentham's vision of the Panopticon, a building designed both for total surveillance of its inmates and to create among the inmates the feeling of being under total surveillance.16 I think we ought to regard Foucault's further suggestion that the Panopticon is the paradigmatic social institution of our society not so much as a literal claim, but rather as a warning similar to Zarathustra's vision of the last man. It shows us what life is like when one attempts to enforce Bentham's principle that each is to count for one and no more than one. In the parable from which I have been taking increasingly lengthy e . xcur· sions the youth shows some capacity to be saved from the last extremity of envy. After he breaks down in tears following his confession, Zarathustra throws his arm around him and reminds the youth that he still "longs for the open heights" and that his "soul thirsts for the stars." To some extent he takes pan in what Zarathustra will call, a few chapters later, radiant virtue (die scbenc kende Tugend). Radiant virtue is the inverse of envy; it is the virtue which cor responds to that vice. Whereas envy pulls into itself every cause for its own hostility and dwells on these to exaggeration, the person of radiant virtue "is in satiable in wanting to give." That person is an examplar, a tow � r of strength. In today's language we talk of stars (of falm, or in other pursuits that are publically known) and Zarathustra compares the figure of radiant vinue to the inexhausti ble radiance of the sun. Following this analogy the envious man is a black hole, a star which has collapsed upon itself. He and it become evident to us only through their destructive behavior. The envious man avoids contact but still acts at a distance by means of the evil eye. (Zarathustra says to the youth that "Bet t � than your words, your eye tells me all your peril.") The youth is torn be tween envy and radiant virtue. Zarathustra describes this conflict in terms of the metaphor of the prison; "you are still a prisoner who is plotting his freedom," he says. The youth has explained already how he is trapped in the prison formed by the distrust (or evil eye) of the others and his own distrust of himself. Even the free man of the spirit must purify himself, Zarathustra says, for much of the prison remains within him and his eye must become pure. I think that with Bentham's Panopticon and Foucault's carceral society in mind we can read this advice to the youth as more than a simple injunction to noble aspira tion. It also contains an analysis of the site of his condition-the prison-house of envy-and of the chief instrument and symptom of that condition-the eye, which can be either a radiant orb or the instrument of invidious calculation and comparison.
But how can the youth, or any of us, purify his eye? At this point Zarathustra's advice may seem distressingly vague. The problem, he is sug gesting, is not so much that of escape but of a radical change in which one would no longer be on the lookout for the guards and other prisoners in the prison-house of envy. But such a change, or rather the description of what such a change would be like, will require the teachings of the will to power and the eternal recurrence which can ground and enable the metaphorical accounts of the virtues and vices which Zarathustra is giving in this early pan of the book.
Perhaps the best that can be done rhetorically is to depict, as Zarathustra does in a final warning, the final terms in the involuted spiral on which the envious man is launched. The noble men who lose their highest hopes, he says, become slanderers of all hope. This is a pattern which has already become familiar in our analysis. But here it is advanced as a terrible possibility for the youth to whom Zarathustra speaks, not as a general but rather impersonal point about human nature. "Do not reject the hero in your soul!" may be somewhat trite-Walter Kaufmann calls it "advice for adolescents"-but it may also be the appropriate thing to say.
Nietzsche sometimes praises envy, as in the essay on "Homer's Contest." Such praise of envy seems almost always to resolve itself into a celebration of r NIETZSCHE ON ENVY Ll the agonistic spirit, which Nietzsche contrasts with the atomized li�e of mo�ern men. The envy which is considered here is modern envy of the silent vanety.
Nietzsche seems to imply that the stirrings of envy can be expressed through speech and action or that such expression can be restrained, with the conse quence that "silent envy grows in silence." In his advice "On War and Warriors" Zarathustra says: "I know the hatred and envy of your hearts. You are not great enough not to know hatred and envy. So be great enough not to be ashamed of them!" (Z 7 3-74) Envy is indeed one of the seven deadly sins and one which it is extremely difficult to admit to either oneself or to others. One typically denies one's own envy by complimenting the envied one or, as in the section we have just looked at, one keeps one's distance in the hope that the issue will not arise. If envy is indeed a human all too human emotion, we might all do better to be less ashamed that we feel it.
